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A philosophical tradition such as Humanism is not only his-
torically relevant for the comprehension of a given period of West-
ern thought: Humanism is also essential if we want to become 
aware of our present-day speculative situation. G. B. Vico not 
only belongs to Humanism, but has indeed rethought it to its 
most extreme consequences. By inverting the notion of traditional 
metaphysics-as I wish to demonstrate in this paper-did the 
great Neapolitan thinker succeed in legitimizing a new ~pproach 
to the religious problem? As a staunch believer in metaphorical 
thinking as the primary instance of speculation, and an enemy of 
traditional ontological metaphysics, where does Vico stand in re-
lation to Heidegger's negation of onto-theological metaphysics? 
Insofar as the reappraisal of Humanist thought is concerned-
which is also a topic implicit in this paper-one needs be familiar 
with, in Vico's own words, the boria dei dotti [the scholar's conceit] 
of German idealist and existential metaphysics, which has always 
denied that the Humanist tradition may have had any speculative 
[Translated from the Italian by Roberta Piazza J 
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importance for the proper understanding of the passion behind 
such a problematic. Let us not forget that it was Hegel who as-
serted that "philosophy has survived as a special instance of the 
German nation" [dass sie in der deutschen nation als eine Eigen-
tuehmlichkeit sich erhalten hat], adding: "We have received this su-
preme profession from nature" [Wir haben den hoehren Beruf von 
der Natur erhalten]. 1 
This is very much in line with the answer Heidegger gave 
me when, in handing me the Letter on Humanism for publication 
(1947), he refused to give me another manuscript of a purely 
speculative character, saying: "This is a German concern" ["Nein, 
das ist eine deutsche Angelegenheit"]. 
But let us get back to Vico. A striking feature of this thinker 
is that his philosophy is not grounded on any apriori conception, 
but rather on the expression of reality in its concrete historicity. 
This element differentiates Vico not only from old traditional 
metaphysics and Medieval speculation, but also from modern 
thought beginning with Descartes. However, we would not be 
dealing thoroughly and in depth with Vico' s thought if we started 
with the statement that the New Science is "new" simply because 
it starts out with the issue of history. It is necessary to investigate 
how, where, and in relation to what that history originates. Is it 
determined by "Divine Providence"-as Vico affirms-so that his 
theory of history takes root in a religious conception of reality? 
The starting point in Vico's speculative thought is not the 
traditional issue of the rational identification of beings or entities, 
whether subjects or objects, but the problem of the word, speci-
fically the question of the ingenious, fantastic word. The German 
tradition, with its tendency to apriori thinking, was unable to 
comprehend and fully appreciate Vico's humanistic speculation. 
In my opinion, Heidegger is the only thinker who could have 
shed some light on Vico. Unfortunately, blinded by the traditional 
interpretation of Humanism as essentially a form of Platonism 
and Neoplatonism, Heidegger took an anti-Humanist position 
without ever knowing or reading Humanist authors, in particular 
Vico.2 
The epochal character of Vico' s main thesis lies in the notion 
that metaphysics should start neither with rational principles nor 
with the issue of beings (as entities), but rather with the word, 
the only element able to reveal human historicity. Vico's work is 
a real phenomenology, that is, a description of how human reality 
"appears" [phainesthai] step by step. We must also bear in mind 
that Vico constantly argues with other philosophers about their 
abstract deductions, thus refusing "what philosophers have 
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hitherto imagined" (NS, § 666).3 The scholar's conceit [boria dei 
dotti], which Vico mentions repeatedly, is the persistent belief that 
all institutions and human attitudes have their foundations in a 
rational metaphysic and that, moreover, knowledge is hidden 
behind myths, fables, and folktales. On the contrary, as will be 
shown presently, myth itself in its ingenious origins is the primary 
expression of knowledge. Hence Vico denies that Homer was a 
philosopher who simply disguised speculation under the veil of 
poetry. All of Homer's fantastic thinking and writing is not an 
allegory of an ahistorical truth, but is rather the act of unveiling 
reality in relation to a concrete historical situation. What we have 
here is the negation of the Medieval notion of allegory: "We denied 
that he [Homer] was ever a philosopher" (NS, § 836). 
Vico firmly believes that the scholar's conceit is responsible 
for the inability to properly understand the cycle of history, for 
if rationality is assumed as the only philosophical criterion, then 
the result is the detachment from the "necessities" of life through 
which the existent manifests itself. Vico notoriously held that 
academics and philosophers came last on the tree of knowledge: 
First [were] the woods, then cultivated fields and huts, next little 
houses and villages, thence cities, finally academies and 
philosophers: this is the order of all progress from the first origins . 
(NS, § 22) 
2. 
Vico identifies two tasks of philosophy: nature and human 
activity. The former is created by God and so can only be com-
prehended by Him. However, up until now nature has been the 
object of inquir y in traditional metaphy sics and it is precisel y thi s 
ontological metaphysics that Vico refutes. The "epochal" in Vico' s 
thought consists in his belief that philosophers and philologist s 
should begin with a metaphysics 
which seeks its proofs not in the external world but within the 
modifications of the mind of him who meditates it. (NS, § 374) 
Vico' s proposed metaphysics does not search for these modifica-
tions in reason but in Genius and in Fantasy, both of which render 
metaphor possible; and since metaphor asserts one thing yet 
meaning something else, it ends up invalidating the principles of 
logic: identity, noncontradiction, and the excluded middle. 
Vico's central point is to abandon a metaphysics of entities 
and therefore ontology and to begin with a new one, the object 
of which would be man's appearance and becoming. This ought 
not to be under stood as an anthropology-which was Heidegger's 
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erroneous charge against Humanism-but rather as the search in 
relation to which human history develops (or becomes). For Vico, 
what is true has no priority over what is certain, i.e., what man-
ifests itself in its historicity. In fact, as he points out, the notion 
of a fixed, rational, and ahistoric "true" proves to be false in the 
long run: 
It will be another great labor of this Science to recover these grounds 
of truth-truth which, with the passage of years and the changes 
in languages and customs, has come down to us enveloped in 
falsehood. (NS, § 150) 
The counterfoisting of the true and the certain is indeed the con-
traposition of what claims an ahistorical universality with respect 
to a rational process and what on the contrary reveals itself histor-
ically. The study of the certain is then the search for what is always 
making itself evident, manifesting itself as new in reality. There 
is an identity of truth and fact: 
In Latin, verum (the true) and fact um (what is made) are interchange-
able or, in the language of the Schools, convertible terms. 4 
This conception will radically transform the notion of truth, which 
will no longer be identified with the rational process but with the 
"unveiling" of the real in history. 
Another of man's ways of "doing" [fare] things is the creating 
of mathematical and geometric worlds, both of which are, how-
ever, entirely formal since they are based upon fictions, upon 
unreality: 
Turning this defect of his mind to useful ends, he [man] then 
invents for himself two things by abstraction, as they call it: the 
point, which can be drawn, and the unit, which can be multiplied. 
But both are fictions: for if a point is drawn it ceases to be a point, 
and if a unit is multiplied it is no longer one .... In this way he 
fashions for himself a world of shapes and numbers, such as can 
be contained entirely within himself, and by extension ... he 
produces an infinite number of works, because the truths he per-
ceives within himself are infinite. (A WI, p. 54) 
By identifying the true with what is made, Vico does not aspire to 
a purely formal world, implicitly taking ante litteram a critical position 
against any purely formal analytical philosophy. Further on in 
the same 1710 text, Vico says: 
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The most certain things are those which, redressing the defects of 
their origin, resemble divine knowledge in their operation, inas -
much as in them the true is convertible with what is made. (AW!, 
p. 55) 
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The task is then that of searching for what is not formal in history, 
for it is there that human capacity is realized. Vico's famous thesis 
is that in the darkness of night in which humanity was originally 
enwrapped there appeared an eternal light, that is, the civil world 
made by men. How, one might ask at this point, does history 
come about? Is history initiated by Divine Providence? Are we 
dealing with a new approach to the problem of religion indepen-
dent of any onto-theological metaphysics? 
In interpreting Vico's thought, the starting point is the concept 
of necessity. In order to deal with its urgency, Vico posits the role 
of Genius as the primary ability to see "what is alike" [simile] and 
as such the origin of ingenious thinking and speaking: 
And since naturally the discovery or invention of things comes 
before criticism of them, it was fitting that the infancy of the world 
should concern itself with the operation of the human mind, for 
the world then had need of all inventions for the necessities and 
utilities of life, all of which had been provided before the 
philosophers appeared .... (NS, § 699) 
Such are the necessities which were time after time originally per-
ceived as divine commands due to their urgency, and from which 
Vico goes on to extract a natural theogony. It is here that Vico's 
"New Critical Art" originates, expressed in the following terms: 
And here, by the principles of this new critical art, we consider at 
what determinate times and on what particular occasions of human 
necessity or utility felt by the first men of the gentile world, they, 
with frightful religions which they themselves feigned and believed 
in, imagined first such and such gods and then such and such 
others. (NS, § 7) 
This originary knowing is theological because 
the crudest gentile humanity thought that all institutions necessary 
or useful to the human race were deities. (Ibid.) 
From this sterns our need to see and investigate closely the struc-
ture of ingenious and inventive thought, in which the act of finding 
(actually, rediscovering: ritrovare) precedes the act of judging. 
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3. 
In On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians Taken from the Origins 
of the Latin Language [De Antiquissima ... ] Vico defines ingenium5 
as follows: 
Ingenium is the power of connecting separate and diverse elements. 
The Latins described it as acutum [acute] or obtusum [obtuse] . 
. . . Thus, when obtuse, ingenuity links different things more slowly; 
when acute, it does so more swiftly. (AWI, p. 70) 
In the Vindiciae he holds that 
acuteness of genius . . . moves and joins, in a common relation 
with a latent truth, things which to the many (volgo) appeared to 
be so different and far from one another. (Opere, p. 928) 
The theory of ingenium with its originary function, together 
with the priority of ingenious and subtle thinking and speaking, 
can only be fully comprehended from the perspective of a Topica 
of sensation, that is to say, in relation to those urgencies and 
needs which are met in the same process that generates the variety 
of worlds. Ingenious activity can thus be described as the response 
to necessita [necessity]. The originary Topica is sensitive and inven-
tive because it is through our senses that originary needs manifest 
themselves. 
Now ingenious activity is originarily expressed through myth. 
Logic, according to Vico, derives from logos, which means word, 
speech, allowing the thinker to go back to the Greek term muthos, 
which in turn refers to the word as a dumb deictic sign created 
to meet natural needs. Thus logic has nothing rational in its origin. 
As Vico says in the New Science: 
"Logic" comes from logos, whose first and proper meaning was 
fabula, fable, carried over into Italian as favella, speech. In Greek 
the fable was also called mythos, myth, whence comes the Latin 
mutus, mute. For speech was born in mute times as a mental [or 
sign] language ... [which] existed before vocal or articulate [lan-
guage]; whence logos means both word and idea. (NS, § 401) 
Mythology, in turn, is the project of a tale, a fable in which action 
becomes meaningful as praxis, a story in relation to which institu-
tions and characters find their model, the universal and the various 
genres for the different individuals. With the project inherent in 
myth, the necessity of place and time is modified accordingly: 
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myth-to which a religious meaning is attached-is not outside 
history at all. Rather, it expresses the historicity of each single 
different era which continually strikes us with the wondrous reve-
lation of always dissimilar worlds. Myth is an allegory, a metaphor 
not representative of an "other" world outside of history, but 
rather it is the metaphor for what is realized in history. 
Myth itself is a universal because in relation to myth the 
particular is determined under a time-marking urgency: the project 
of myth reveals the various ideals - Vico's "fantastic universals"-
as those different ideas to which one must conform: a continually 
changing ideal of courage (for instance: Achilles), oflove, patience, 
and justice. In the project of myth, individuals come to life under 
a "genre" which is not rational, hence not abstractly fixed upon 
a world of ahistorical ideas. In the mythical world, institutions 
are not rational deductions, but rather belong to the tale which 
corresponds to the needs of the "here" and "now." 
When, on the contrary, myth and fantastic universals crystal-
lize, i.e., become frozen and static and claim at the same time to 
bear a meaning beyond the boundaries of history - when they 
become "rational" -then the attitudes that correspond to them 
become dogmatic and are no longer representative of natural 
needs. Myth and the world it expresses tumble down at this point, 
followed by a time of renewed barbarity with its load of sorrow, 
tragedy, and suffering. Vico says, in fact, that 
Mythologies, as their name indicates, must have been the proper 
languages of the fables; the fables being imaginative class concepts, 6 
as we have shown, the mythologies must have been the allegories 
corresponding to them . . . signifying the diverse species or the 
diverse individuals comprised under these genera. So that they must 
have a univocal signification connoting a quality common to all 
their species and individuals (as Achilles connotes an idea of valor 
common to all strong men, or Ulysses an idea of prudence common 
to all wise men). (NS, § 403) [emphasis added] 
The fantastic universal [imaginative class concept in the Ber-
gin-Fisch translation of the New Science] is endowed not only with 
the role of striking the imagination, but also with that of showing 
how a situation should be faced, in concrete terms. In other words, 
fantastic universals are genres which include their species; they 
are not isolated in and by themselves but arise within a given 
situation expressing itself by means of a fable or a myth. If history 
begins with fantastic universals, that is to say, with metaphors-
such as Godfrey, a metaphor for captain-and if, owing to its 
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concrete character, the fantastic universal must appear in a finite 
story (one which begins and ends in itself), then it is always 
fabulous. And if Vico persists in asserting that fantastic universals 
are determined by naturali necessita [natural necessities], then their 
cogency is the source of myth and history: 
The poetic characters, in which the essence of the fables consists, 
were born of the need of a nature incapable of abstracting forms 
and properties from subjects. Consequently they must have been 
the manner of thinking of entire peoples, who had been placed 
under this natural necessity in the times of their greatest barbarism. 
(NS,§ 816) 
Myth portrays people, heroes, characters on a grand "representa-
tional" scale, so that the praxis of myth expresses an exemplary 
order . Vico reminds us that: "person" [persona] means nothing 
more than "mask" [maschera] and that such a word does not derive, 
as it is often believed, from pers6nare, but from personari, 
a verb which we conjecture meant to wear the skins of wild beasts, 
which was permitted only to heroes .... The poets clothe their 
heroes in these pelts, and above all Hercules .... To such an origin 
... is to be traced ... the Italian application of the term personaggi, 
personages, to men of high station and great representations. (NS, 
§ 1034) 
Myth determines praxis which is inclusive of a beginning, a de-
velopment, and an end. Praxis, then, does not mean an action 
carried out for the purpose of achieving something else (poiesis), 
but to express through action attitudes and "characters" which 
disclose an order. On this basis, Vico maintains that ancient juris-
prudence was a severe form of theological poetry, a serious poem 
which the Romans used to perform at the forum. 
4. 
In order to explore further Vico's notion of myth, perhaps 
we can turn to Aristotle, who formulates his version of what myth 
is together with the definition of tragedy in the Poetics. Aristotle 
accurately lists six constitutive moments of tragedy (Poetics 1449 
b 49): 
1. Staging [kosmos opseos], which is the visual world in which the 
action takes place 
2. Rhythm 
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3. The word [Lexis] 
4. The spirit of the characters [ethos] 
5. The ideas 
6. Myth, that is, the fable or the story itself 
Aristotle explicitly says that only myth can represent the praxis of 
tragedy, and not thought, characters, or words . Moreover, Aris-
totle's definition of tragedy is mimesis tes praxeos (1448 a 1). So, if 
myth is the essence of tragedy and tragedy the imitation of praxis, 
then one needs to be familiar with Aristotle's notion of praxis 
based on two radically different forms of action: poiesis and praxis. 
The former aims to reach an external target and is over once it 
achieves the desired result: the act of building a house becomes 
useless the very moment the house is built. This act then is poietic 
because it is only a way of carrying out something which is not 
an end in itself, but concerns something else. As he writes in the 
Metaphysics: 
Those actions that end with the attainment of the purpose are never 
really an end but only a means to attain an end ... therefore they 
cannot be recognized as praxis ... as authentic praxis can be 
considered only those actions whose end is contained within itself. 
(Metaphysics, 1048 b 18) 
Now if we turn to the Poetics, we find the following assertion: 
We have established that a tragedy is the imitation of an action 
which is whole and complete (tragodian teleias kai hole s praxeos 
einai mimesin) and also a certain size (echouses ti megethos) .... 
"Whole" means having a beginning, a middle, and an end. The 
beginning, while not necessarily followed by something else, is, 
by definition, followed by something else. The end, on the contrary, 
follows something else by definition . . . but nothing else comes 
after it. (Poetics, 1450 b 21 [G. M. A. Grube trans.]) 
Myth, which is the foundation and essence of tragedy, is therefore 
a story, a fable with a beginning, a middle, and an end, beyond 
which there is nothing else; it is a whole, a development that is 
fully enclosed within itself. Being the tale of an action, of praxis, 
myth is different from the poietic act carried out in order to realize 
something else. On the contrary, myth is the manifestation and 
revelation of a world with an end in itself, with its own ideas, 
characters, beginning, and end: a concluded system. 
The belief that historical principles are not rational but mythi-
cal and fabulous determines the epochal aspect of Vico's thought 
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vis-a-vis traditional metaphysics as well as Cartesian rationalism 
and German idealist metaphysics. "The first sages of the Greek 
world were the theological poets," says Vico in the New Science 
(§ 199), and immediately after that: "All barbarian histories have 
fabulous beginnings" (NS, § 202), where fabulous is here under-
stood precisely in the sense of theological poetry. The earliest 
wise men were the theological poets because they created myths 
in which the story expressed the needs of a given historical period. 
Owing to its metaphoric character, this theology is actually poetry: 
Now this is the threefold labor of great poetry: 1) to invent sublime 
fables suited to the popular understanding; 2) to perturb to excess, 
with a view to the end proposed; and 3) to teach the vulgar to act 
virtuously, as the poets have taught themselves. (NS, § 376) 
The epochal aspect of Vico' s thought becomes even more apparent 
in the following passage: 
[Because] as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all 
things by und erstanding them [homo intelligendo fit omnia], this im-
aginative metaphysics [metafisica fantasticata] shows that man be-
comes all things by not understanding them [homo non intelligendo 
fit omnia ]; and perhaps the latter proposition is truer than the 
former, for when man understands he extends his mind and takes 
in the things, but when he does not understand he makes the 
things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself 
into them. (NS , § 405) 
If metaphor and myth express natural needs, then metaphoric 
language, rich in fantastic elements, is originary and precise, un-
like the abstruse language of rational metaphysics, which gets 
entangled with and lost in the web of abstract ahistorical concepts. 
We can then say, with Vico, that 
languages are more beautiful in proportion as they are richer in 
these condensed heroic expressions; that they are more beautiful 
because they are more expressive; and that because they are more 
expressive they are truer and more faithful. And that on the con-
trary, in proportion as they are more crowded with words of un-
known origin (that is, with abstract, rational and ahistorical words), 
they are less delightful [dilettevoli], because obscure and confused, 
and therefore more likely to deceive and lead astray. (NS, § 445) 
From this stems the notion of Topics, understood as the art of 
inventing, of finding, of "coming-to" or "coming-forth" [Italian: 
invenire], which, for Vico, was entirely based upon the senses and 
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aimed at inventing but not arbitrarily rather to cope with necessity : 
"In those earliest of times men needed to come up with [ritrovare] 
all the things necessary to human life" (NS, § 497). This language is 
fantastic and not arbitrary because it arises out of myth, and myth 
responds to necessity. Yet, 
the grammarian s, encountering great numbers of words which give 
confused and indistinct ideas of things, and not knowing their 
origins ... have given peace to their ignorance by setting up the 
universal maxim that articulate human words have arbitrary signifi-
cations (che le voci umane articolate significanoa placito]. (NS,§ 444) 
Vico makes the radical distinction between genius [ingenium] and 
reason, invention and judgment by asserting that knowledge is 
acquired by means of the first term, and by adding that no inven-
tion is given without judgment, nor is judgment possible without 
invention (cf. AWI, p. 72). In other words, if genius discovers 
similarities and relations "here" and "now," it paves the way for 
the rational process which in turn draws consequences from inven-
tive discovery and allows the construction of a valid world within 
the boundaries of that discovery. Hence the theory of genius 
[ingenium] does not exclude the rational process at all. Indeed, the 
rational world acquires its validity solely in the historical context 
revealed by inventiveness [ingenium]. When "invention" and "dis-
covery" are no longer valid, the rational world based on that very 
"discovery" falls apart. Using Heidegger rather that Vico, it can 
be said that ingenium is the memory of Being. 
5. 
All traditional metaphysics before and after Vico, preceding 
and following Humanism, up to Heidegger, starts with the issue 
of beings [enti] and abstract ahistorical principles, and ends up 
with onto-theo-logical metaphysics. The New Science is new because 
it does not stud y nature but rather human becoming, and poses 
the problem of what it is that "discloses" human historicity. Both 
the humanistic tradition and Vico begin their philosophical inves-
tigation with customs and rituals such as religion, marriage, and 
the burial of the dead, which are intrinsically human. Vico's prob-
lem is to identify right at the origin these attitudes; most important , 
however, is the word and, more precisely, the "fantastic" word. 
The word is born out of necessity: poetic locution must have 
begun 
by a necessity of human nature ... just as, by the same necessity, 
the fables, or imaginative universals [universali fantastici], arose be-
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fore the rational or philosophic universals, which were formed 
through the medium of prose speech. (NS, § 460) 
It appears, then, that for Vico man's needs for understanding 
were taken care of by myths and stories before the rational prose 
of the philosophers made their appearance. And it follows from 
this that the activity of judging, of inferring an order and of sys-
tematizing a world and its institutions come after invention and 
ingenious, fantastic discovery. 
By the same token, linguistic differences are not arbitrary, 
but are triggered by different necessities: 
For by virtue of the aforesaid diversity of their natures they 
[peoples] have regarded the same utilities or necessities of human 
life from different points of view, and there have thus arisen so 
many national customs, for the most part differing from one another 
and at times contrary to one another; so and not otherwise there 
have arisen as many different languages as there are nations. (NS, 
§ 445) 
In his conception of history - which entails a passage from 
the metaphysics of beings (entities) to the metaphysics of action 
and human praxis-Vico's main concern is the problematic of 
whether and how it is possible to envisage a new way to deal 
with the issue of religion. To this purpose, he advances the thesis 
of Divine Providence, which manifests itself in and through his-
tory, and which moreover leaves out Epicurean chance and histor-
ical fate. Vico does not start out from ontology but from philology, 
where the latter is understood as man's primary response to his 
needs in a concrete situation. By reinterpreting philosophy and 
philology, one discovers "the design of an ideal eternal history 
traversed in time by the histories of all nations" (NS, § 7). Vico 
holds that languages and literature (letters) are contemporary to 
each other, so literature cannot be thought of as a purely "literary" 
function, but rather as if endowed with the capacity and the task 
of unveiling the characteristic features of language. This explains 
Vico' s protest against the philologists who 
have believed that among the nations languages first came into 
being and then letters, whereas ... letters and languages were 
born twins and proceeded apace through all their three stages. 
(NS, § 33) 
Thus Vico insists that in order to study the problem of Divine 
Providence one needs to investigate the problem of the word, 
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as even now we may observe in peasants and other crude men, 
who in conflicts between words and meanings obstinately say that 
their right stands for them in the words. And this counsel of divine 
providence to the end that the gentiles, not yet capable of universals 
... might be led by this very particularity of their words to observe 
the laws universally. (NS, § 38) 
85 
As a result, Vico emphasizes not the ahistorical abstraction of the 
true [il vero], but the certain [ii certo], that is, the historical manifes-
tation of reality in its historicity: 
The first gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of nature, 
were poets, who spoke in poetic characters. (NS, § 34) 
The preeminence of poetry is affirmed with references to Virgil 
and Horace: 
Virgil uses the word [viri] emphatically in that sense at the begin-
ning of his Aeneid: "Arma virunque cano" (Of arms I sing and the 
hero); and Horace, Ad. Pis. 141, translates the first verse of the 
Odyssey: "Die mihi, Musa, virum" (Of the man, 0 Muse, sing to 
me). (NS, § 657) 
It is crucial, then, to bear in mind the Latin tradition which, 
for instance, Heidegger overlooked when he affirmed the origi-
nary function of poetry. Heidegger preferred to limit himself solely 
to Holderlin, Trakl, and George, thus ignoring the humanistic 
tradition, which was thus excluded from the whole issue of the 
founding role of poetry. 
The question to address at this point is whether Divine Pro-
vidence is embedded in the word. Before we can answer the 
question, let us see a practical example of how Vico uses poetic 
metaphor to assert the priority of poetry as the determining factor 
in men's historical world. The God of Poetry, Apollo, desires 
Daphne and pursues her. In her attempt to escape, Daphne trans-
forms herself into a laurel bush and so becomes mankind's 
genealogical tree. The divine Apollo then becomes incarnate 
through history. In Vico's words: 
Apollo begins this history by pursuing Daphne, a vagabond maiden 
wandering through the forests (in the nefarious life); and she, by 
the aid she besought of the gods ... on standing still is changed 
to a laurel (a plant which is ever green in its certain and acknowl-
edged offspring), in the same sense in which the Latins use stipites 
for the stocks of families; and the recourse of barbarism brought 
back the same heroic phraseology, for they call genealogies trees, 
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and the founders they call stocks or stems, and the descendan ts 
branches, and the families lineages. (NS, § 533) 
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If poetry as an ingenious activity is an originary form which allows 
one to relate to and cope with natural necessity by finding 
similarities, it is also by virtue of this capacity that it transforms 
reality, "as a demonstrated necessity of nature" (cf. NS, § 34). 
Therefore: 
Apollo is alwa ys young (just as the life of Daphne, changed to a 
laurel, is alwa ys verdant), for Apollo, through the names of the 
great houses, makes men eternal in their families. (NS§ 538) 
6. 
Vico' s basic thesis on this point is that history is not created 
by men as such , but is rather determined by a superior order to 
which all human beings are subject: hence any anthropological 
perspective is absent from Vico's thought. Men are persons not 
by themselves but only in relation to whether they abide or not 
by that order. The New Science identifies this order in Divine Pro-
vidence, and in this sense Vico' s work reveals his religious inten-
tion. Basically, Vico essays to overcome both the Stoics' thesis, 
according to which fate determines history, and the Epicurean 
philosophy, according to which human becoming is subject only 
to chance. It follows then, that 
in this other principal aspect, this Science is a history of human 
ideas through which it seems that the metaphysics of the human 
mind must proceed; and in accordance with the axiom that "science s 
must begin with the times in which their subject matter begins, " 
this queen of sciences must begin with the times in which the first 
men began to think humanly and not with those in which 
philosophers began to reflect upon human ideas. (NS§ 347; Pompa 
trans.) 
To this end, Vico asserts that such a science must be a historical 
demonstration of Providence and that, moreover, 
it must be a history of the institutions by which, without human 
discernment or counsel, and often against the designs of men, 
providence has ordered this great city of the human race. For 
though this world has been created in time and particular, the 
institutions established therein by providence are universal and 
eternal. (NS, § 342) 
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In other words, the historical cycle in its decay and ruin is deter-
mined by the human absence of an answer to natural needs-to 
"necessita naturali," as Vico calls them-i.e., by withdrawing from 
the hie et nunc of necessity. This is the moment when words become 
abstract and ahistorical, writing no longer corresponds to any real 
urgency, men fall into barbarism and the grip of rationality, and 
the world built on these principles falls irreparably into ruin due 
to dogmatization. This is the barbarity of rationality and the end 
of an epoch, for 
the nature of our civilized minds is so detached from the senses, 
even in the vulgar, by abstractions corresponding to all the abstract 
terms our language abounds in, and so refined by the art of writing, 
and as it were spiritualized by the use of numbers, because even 
the vulgar know how to count and reckon, that it is naturally 
beyond our pow er to form the vast image of this mistress called 
"Sympathetic Nature." (NS,§ 378) 
It cannot be denied that, even in the barbarous age of ration-
ality, men resort to fantasy. However, they can no longer recognize 
its primary or founding function, and so they only deploy fantasy 
as an external substitutive tool to activate the functioning of ra-
tional concepts on the passions, thus reaching where the rational 
process cannot: 
For when we wish to give utterance to our understanding of spiritual 
things we must seek aid from our imagination to explain them and, 
like painter s, form human images of them. (NS, § 402) 
But if poetry is the founding element of humanity-as Vico as-
serts-then it is in poetry where our search should begin to find 
Divine Providen ce. However, how and on what basis can one 
speak of Divine Providence if the philosopher himself maintains 
that poetic language corresponds to "natural necessities" (NS, 
§ 34)? 
All of Vico' s philosophy aims to prove how eternal civil history 
establishes an order through the theory of genius, fantasy, and 
the metaphysical word, a natural providence that sets the artificial 
fires of the various cultures, the theological myths and the different 
institutions which light up the dark night in which man has slum-
bered: Man is walled up in history. The necessity from which 
history springs forth is, in its originarity, natural and abysmal; it 
cannot be deduced rationally. Any new approach to religious 
thought is blocked even against Vico's own intentions. 
Vico writes that in their originally nefarious state men "in 
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despair of nature's succors desired something superior to nature 
to save them" (NS, § 385). But it is impossible to infer from his 
premises the longing for this something superior to nature that 
could save the savage men. Once "in the despair of nature's suc-
cors," men find only history, the urgency to move on through 
history and nothing that can go beyond history: frightened by 
lightning and terrified by storms during barbarian times, the only 
order that appeared was the inexorable continuity of history within 
which man arose, lived, and perished. 
But there's another point which is essential to make: all 
Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Christian thought is informed by the 
preoccupation to save the individual, his sorrows, labors, and 
despair. Running counter to his own intentions, Vico's model 
does not provide an approach to such a conception. The "necessity 
of nature" which gives life to the various worlds and is the cause 
of their birth, flourishing, and extinction in the eternal order of 
history pays no mind to the individual but only to its own reve-
lation, even in its destructive stage. So, then, why is this alogic 
abysmal nature called "divine"? In the ordering of eternal history 
the wisdom of nature is really only interested in saving the species, 
with little or no regard for the individual. History in fact reveals 
the continuity of generations, not the saving of the individual or 
his solace. Such considerations entail man's condemnation of his-
tory and the implacable nature which regards the individual only 
inasmuch as he contributes to the realization of history. The paren-
thesis between birth and death resembles a theater, a series of 
scenes with characters who come to life and act and then die after 
going through tragic and irreversible displacements. In the time 
span between birth and death there appears the terrible conscious-
ness of death, the unheard-of awareness of self, of one's own 
sorrow and hope, of our continuous separation from objects, 
people, and the ephemeral instant: it is the consciousness of the 
tragic aspect of our nonreligious epoch. 
If the actor on the stage exists in relation to the tale, to the 
myth that has been defined here as a closed narrative structure 
with its beginning, development, and end, beyond which nothing 
follows; and if drama imitates praxis, that is to say, an action 
which, different from poiesis, does not exist for an external pur-
pose, then it follows that, using the Cartesian formula, the actor-
who is a man-can maintain not that "I think therefore I am" but 
"I die therefore I am." What is disclosed between birth and death 
is the terrifying consciousness of death, that is, the unheard-of 
consciousness of one's own self, one's own pain and hope and 
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the continuous detachment from reality. 
Vico in recent historical times and before him such pre-
Platonic thinkers as Sophocles and Heraklitos have perceived and 
expressed in their works the tragic character of existence. I think 
it is fitting to end these remarks with a passage from Ungaretti: 
The facts are nevertheless clear and inexorable: there's the bygone 
illusion of a European culture and the proof of reason's impotence 
to save anything; there's science, lethally wounded in its moralistic 
ambitions and dishonored, as it were, by the cruelty of its manifes-
tations. 7 
From this sterns the appropriateness of the doubt that to be con-
signed to the human condition is really a divine gift: 
the continuous dissimulation of the tragic aspect of being human 
to human conscience which is reflected in order to be questioned 
is very much like when an object is reflected in the sea. The object 
becomes a plaything in water, a nothing. It is an ineffable emblem 
which, once fixed, changes according to the moods of the monster: 
a poetry of sweet disclosures, a long drawn amorous lamentation, 
an apparent encountering pining away with antinomic destinies. 8 
Finally it all comes down to the celebration of the miracle of poetry, 
which on a different occasion Ungaretti defined as: 
a mystery, which in poetry is that involuntary attraction of roots 
that brings the words together in a bond beyond their meaning, 
mystery perceivable in the distances of space and through time 
that's given to objects and such as to bring them into view in a 
plateau of forgetfulness, to be disvested even of their names and 
become, impatiently, the criers of dreams ... there's no poetry if 
objects, from the depth of space and night of time, cannot suddenly 
recall their names and overwhelm us, dazzling and frightening us 
with the beauty of their presence. At that point we are invested 
with the precision of this beauty, a precision outside of human 
measure which takes our breath away and all possibilities to exist 
before us or any other presence. 9 
1. Hegel, Works, Vol. XVIII, p. 12. 
2. This problem is dicusscd at length in my Heidegger and the Question of 
Renaissance flumanism (Binghamton, NY: SUNY Medieval and Renaissance Texts 
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